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Financing Agricultural Development: 
The Political Economy of Public Spending on Agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Abstract 
Acknowledging that the agricultural sector can play an important role as an engine of 
pro-poor growth in Sub-Saharan Africa, the purpose of this paper is to identify the factors 
that influence the “political will” of governments to support this sector. The concept of 
“political resources” from the political science literature is used to guide the analysis, as 
it combines the insights from state-centered and society-centered approaches to explain 
agricultural policies. Drawing on panel data covering 14 Sub-Saharan African countries 
over the period 1980-2001, we present empirical evidence showing that political factors 
play  an  important  role  in  determining  government’s  commitment  to  supporting 
agricultural  development.  We  use  a  measure  of  democracy  that  varies  both  across 
countries and within countries over time. Estimates are presented for separate samples of 
democracies and non-democracies, and for a pooled sample of all countries and years 
irrespective of the democratic status. Our results suggest that the rural poor do exercise 
electoral  leverage  in  democracies;  larger  rural  population  shares  are  associated  with 
higher spending on agriculture in democracies but not in authoritarian regimes. We also 
find evidence consistent with the theoretical prior that larger farmers tend to be better 
organized in interest groups. Specifically, we find that the share of traditional agricultural 
exports such as coffee and cocoa in the total value of exports, which may be an indicator 
for  the  ability  of  farmers’  to  organize  themselves  as  interest  groups,  induces  greater 
spending  on  agriculture.  This  result  holds  true  for  both  democracies  and  non-
democracies.  
JEL subject codes: Q 18, O 13, H 3, H 5 
1  Introduction 
At the beginning of the 21
st century, food insecurity and poverty remain major global 
challenges. More than one billion people still live on less than 1 dollar a day. Although   2 
their total number decreased during the last 20 years, mostly due to successes in Asia, the 
number  of poor  people  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  has  almost  doubled  during  this  period 
(Chen and Ravaillon, 2004). Sub-Saharan Africa is also the only region in the world 
where food production has not kept path with population increase. As a consequence, the 
number of malnourished people in Africa increased from around 88 million in 1970 to 
over 200 million in 2001 (Rosegrant, et al., 2005). These rather discouraging trends have 
occurred despite the renewed emphasis of the international community on food security 
and poverty reduction during the 1990s. The first of the eight Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) reinforces this commitment: It aims at halving hunger and poverty by 
2015. 
Historical experience and economic theory show it is a promising strategy for stagnant 
food-insecure  low-income  economies  to  invest  in  agriculture,  especially  smallholder 
agriculture,  to achieve  food  security,  reduce poverty  and  to  set  economies  on  a  path 
towards industrialization (Mellor, 1976). As Lipton (2005) notes, there is virtually no 
example of mass poverty reduction in modern history that did not start with sharp rises in 
employment  and self-employment  income  due  to  increased  productivity  among  small 
family farms. As Hazell and Roell (1983) have shown, it is the growth linkages of the 
agricultural sector that make it an “engine” of pro-poor growth. 
1 
At  the  2003  Assembly  of  the  African  Union  in  Maputo,  the  African  Heads  of  State 
eventually acknowledged the role that agriculture needs to play in the development of 
their economies: They  made a  commitment to  allocate at least 10% of their national 
budgetary resources to agricultural development (AU, 2003). However, reaching this goal 
requires  a  considerable  increase  in  the  financial  resources  that  African  governments 
spend  on  agriculture.  According  to  a  study  on  public  expenditure  in  a  sample  of  43 
developing  countries  (Fan  and  Rao,  2003),  the  share  of  the  total  government  budget 
allocated to agriculture in the African countries declined from 6 % in 1980 to 5 % in 
                                                 
1 There is a debate on whether agriculture can play a similar role for promoting pro-poor growth in Africa 
today as it did in Asia during the time of the Green Revolution (compare Ellis, 2005). However, the critics 
of an agriculture-led development strategy have not yet shown which other sector in low-income African 
economies would have the potential to create comparable employment and linkage effects (compare Hazell 
and Diao, 2005).   3 
1998. By contrast, the Asian countries in the sample spent on the average 15 % of their 
budget on agriculture in 1990, as compared to 10 % in 1998 (Fan and Rao, 2003). 
These  figures  beg  the  question  as  to  why  public  spending  on  agriculture  in  African 
countries  has  been  so  low  in  the  past.  The  low  commitment  to  agriculture  is  often 
attributed to a lack of “political will” to spend public financial resources on this sector. 
Against  this  background,  the  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  contribute  to  a  better 
understanding of the factors that explain the “political will” – or the lack thereof – to 
spend government resources for agricultural development.  
From an economic perspective, one may argue that the protection rate of the agricultural 
sector is a better indicator of the political commitment to support agriculture than the 
agricultural budget share. However, the protection rate is the outcome of various political 
decisions, including decisions on macro-economic parameters and on other sectors. The 
implications of those decisions on agriculture are often unintended, at least partly, by 
political  decision-makers  (compare  Krueger,  et  al.,  1991).
2  In  contrast,  the  share  of 
agriculture in the national budget is the most visible and direct measure on which policy-
makers decide. Hence, it is a useful variable for explaining the “political will” to support 
agricultural development from a political economy perspective.  
This paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, the literature on the political economy of 
agricultural  policy-making  is  briefly  reviewed.  Section  3  presents  the  conceptual 
framework and the data. In Section 4, the results are presented and discussed. Section 5 
draws some conclusions. 
2  Insights from the Literature 
From  an  analytical  perspective,  the  “political  will”  to  spend  financial  resources  on 
agricultural  development  can  be  interpreted  as  the  outcome  of  political  decisions  on 
agricultural policy, which are influenced by a variety of factors. The literature on the 
political  economy  of  agricultural  policy-making  in  developing  countries  provides  a 
                                                 
2 One can also argue for a distinction between those public expenditures that provide public goods and 
those that provide private goods in form of “non-social” subsidies (compare Lopez, 2005). However, these 
figures are difficult to obtain for Africa.    4 
diverse set of explanations (see reviews by Binswanger and Denininger, 1997 and by De 
Gorter and  Swinnen, 2002).  Following a typical distinction in political science, these 
explanations  can  be  grouped  into  society-centered  and  state-centered  approaches. 
Society-centered  approaches  have  been  the  dominant  thrust  in  this  literature.  They 
focused  on  the  role  of  different  urban  and  rural  interest  groups  and  their  ability  to 
organize themselves as effective lobby groups. For obvious reasons, the rural poor face 
the largest obstacles to organize themselves, especially if they are involved in food crop 
production and subsistence farming. Larger farmers, and farmers growing export crops 
are better able to organize themselves, often in commodity-specific organizations (Bates, 
1981). Van de  Walle (2001) recently criticized these society-centered approaches and 
advanced a state-centered explanation, which highlights the role of the “neo-patrimonial 
state” in Africa. Swinnen, et al. (2001) found that the type of political regime matters for 
agricultural  policy.  Their  historical  analysis  suggests  that  democratic  reform  gives 
farmers’ more voice in agricultural policy-making. 
Other factors have also been highlighted in the literature (see Binswanger and Deininger, 
1997;  De  Gorter  and  Swinnen,  2002).  They  include  the  role  of  ideas  and  ideology, 
especially regarding the role of agriculture in economic development, and regarding the 
role of the state in promoting development. Food supply shortages and rising food prices 
have also prompted governments to adopt policies that will increase food supply.  
While the literature on the political economy of agricultural policy choices in developing 
countries is rich and multi-faceted, most of this literature provides ex-post explanations 
of individual cases. The “classics” in this field - which took a broader perspective and 
tried to find a systematic explanation for a larger set of countries - are based on research 
conducted in the 1970s and 1980s (De Janvry, 1981; Bates, 1981; Krueger et al. 1991). 
Meanwhile,  important  frame  conditions  of  agricultural  policy-making  have  changed, 
especially in Africa. Importantly, many countries have become democracies, which may   5 
have  increased  the  incentives  of  governments  to  invest  in  agriculture  and  rural 
development.
3  
3  Conceptual Framework and Data 
Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework used for the analysis is based on the concept of “political 
resources”, which emerged in the political science literature as an approach to combine 
the  arguments  of  society-centered  approaches,  state-centered  approaches  and  political 
conflict  theories  (Hicks  and  Misra,  1993).  Following  Hicks  and  Misra  (1993),  we 
distinguish  between  instrumental  political  resources,  which  are  the  specific  resources 
used by actors to realize their perceived interests, and infrastructural political resources, 
which empower the actions of the interest groups and condition the effectiveness of their 
instrumental political resources. Electoral leverage and interest group organizations are 
example of instrumental political resources, while the fiscal capacity of the state and the 
type  of  political  regime  are  examples  of  infrastructural  political  resources.  This 
framework is used to guide the selection of variables and the analysis. 
Data 
Table 1 lists the countries included in the analysis. The sample includes 14 Sub-Saharan 
African countries, for which data on the share of agriculture on total spending is available 
for the period from 1980 to 2002. Table 2 describes the variables used for the analysis. 
The major variable capturing the instrumental political resources of rural people is the 
percentage of the rural population. We assume that in democratic political regimes, the 
rural  population  can exercise electoral  leverage.  In  non-democratic  regimes,  the  rural 
population lacks this type of leverage, but it may still influence decision-making as a 
potential source of  political  unrest.  In  one  model  specification,  we include an  ethnic 
fractionalization index to test the assumption that in ethnically divided societies, people 
primarily vote along ethnic lines rather than economic interests (Keefer and Khemani 
                                                 
3 Worldwide, the number of democratic countries has grown threefold from 41 to 121 between 1974 and 
2002 (Diamond, 2003).This figure reflects the increase in electoral democracies, not necessarily in fully 
consolidated democracies.   6 
2003). As an indicator of farmers’ ability to organize themselves as interest groups, we 
include the value of agricultural food exports. In view of lack of other data on farmers’ 
organizations, we use this indicator based on findings of the literature which show that 
farmers are in general able to organize along export commodities (Bates, 1981).  
As an indicator of the type of political regime, we use the index of the Polity IV data set. 
The index takes values from +10 to -10 depending on a variety of institutional features 
ranging from constraints on the executive to the openness of elections. In one model 
specification,  we  use  the  value  of  0  to  split  countries  in  democratic  versus  non-
democratic regimes. Since interest groups usually need time to get established and learn 
how to use their instrumental political resources effectively, we control for the age of 
democracy, measured by the number of years of uninterrupted democratic rule in any 
given country. Three indicators are used to capture the capacity of the state to spend 
funds on agriculture, which is another category of infrastructural political resources. The 
indicators  include  the  Gross  Domestic  Product  (GDP)  per  capita,  the  development 
assistance received from all donors (ODA), and total government revenues excluding all 
grants. For the 1990s, it is possible to differentiate the ODA by sector and to distinguish 
between government resources and ODA by sector. We use these data for a descriptive 
analysis of major trends. 
To account for external factors and time effects, we consider three additional variables: A 
drought in the previous year is expected to increase agricultural spending. According to 
Sen  (1981),  this  effect  should  be  more  likely  to  occur  in  democracies  than  in  non-
democracies. We also include dummies to indicate the decades of the 1980s and 1990s 
respectively. These dummies may capture changes in perceptions regarding the role of 
the state and the role of agriculture as well as other factors.  
4  Results and Discussion 
Trends in public spending 
Figures displays the trend of total agricultural spending in the countries included in the 
sample. The figure shows that the resources spent by African countries remained stagnant 
during the 1980s and 1990s in spite of the population increase that occurred during this   7 
period.  ODA  for  agriculture  considerably  declined  in  the  mid-1990s.  In  spite  of  an 
increasing trend thereafter, it never reached previous levels. While the own efforts of 
African governments to support agriculture did increase since the end of the 1990s, the 
commitment of the donors to support this sector sharply declined during this period. As 
Figure 2 shows, education is characterized by a continuous increase of both government 
resources and donor funding. In the case of health, ODA has always been comparatively 
high,  while  the  resources  governments  spend  in  this  sector  continuously  increased 
considerably since the mid 1990s. 
Regression results 
The dependent variable used in the regression is the share of public expenditure spent on 
agriculture,  because,  as  explained  above,  this  variable  appears  most  suitable  from  a 
political economy point of view. Table 3 presents the results of three OLS regression 
models which the data for democracies and non-democracies are pooled. The first model 
includes all explanatory variables. This reduces the number of observations to 73. The 
second  and  third  models  do  not  include  the  ethnic  fractionalization  index,  for  which 
limited data are available. In addition, Model 3 also excludes the role of agriculture in the 
country’s  exports.  The  share  of the  rural  population  and  the  dummy variable  for the 
1980s turn out to have a significant positive influence on the agricultural budget share in 
all  three  models.  Expectedly,  ethnic  fractionalization  reduces  the  agricultural  budget 
share. Unexpectedly, the GDP per capita has a significant negative influence in all three 
models. In Model 3, the age of democracy and donor funding become significant. Table 4 
distinguishes the results for democracies and non-democracies. In non-democracies, only 
the  importance  of  agricultural  exports  has  a  significant  influence  on  the  agricultural 
budget share. 
Discussion 
The results indicate that in democracies, the rural population has more possibilities to 
exercise voice leading to a higher budget share for agriculture. Due to data limitations, it 
remains unclear whether this effect is achieved through electoral leverage or other means, 
such as lobbying. We find that the share of traditional agricultural exports such as coffee 
cocoa, in the total value of exports induces greater spending on agriculture. This can be   8 
interpreted as evidence consistent with the theoretical prior that farmers are better able to 
organize themselves as interest groups along export commodities. However, one has to 
consider that in view of the need to earn foreign exchange, governments may have an 
incentive to spend more on agriculture even in the absence of farmers’ organizations, if 
agricultural  exports  represent  this  opportunity.  There  is  also  evidence  that  ethnic 
fractionalization leads to concentration on other sectors than agriculture. Even though 
more countries are now democracies than in the 1980s, the budget share for agriculture 
was significantly higher in the 1980s, so that other factors not captured in our models 
need  to  be  considered.  The  increased  budget shares  on  health  and  education and the 
reduction of agricultural budgets in the context of macro-economic structural adjustment 
programs may play a role (compare Fan and Rao, 2003, see Figures 1-3). Unexpectedly, 
droughts do not appear to increase agricultural spending in the following year, but this 
finding  may  be  influenced  by  problems  to  capture  the  influence  of  droughts  on 
agricultural production. ODA turned only out to have a significant influence in the model 
that did not include the ethnic fractionalization index and the agricultural export index. 
This suggests that ODA does not “crowd out” government investment in agriculture, if 
domestic political factors are accounted for. 
5  Concluding Remarks 
Interpreted in terms of the conceptual framework, one can conclude that a democratic 
type of political regime and the availability of government revenues tend to enable the 
rural population to use their instrumental political resources, especially their electoral 
leverage,  for  achieving  a  higher  budget share  dedicated  to  agriculture.  However,  this 
effect does not outweigh the general decline of the budget share allocated to agriculture 
that occurred since the 1980s, which may be associated with a declining recognition of 
the need to support agricultural development for poverty reduction and food security. 
Future research of the political economy of agricultural spending in developing countries 
will be useful to analyze further explanatory factors which could not be addressed in this 
study. These include the political interaction between public spending on agriculture vis-
a-vis the spending other sectors such as defense, health and education, and the role of 
ideas and ideologies regarding the role of agriculture in economic development. In view   9 
of the persistent problems of food insecurity and poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa, more 
emphasis needs to be placed on identifying strategies to finance agricultural development. 
These  strategies  should  also  take  the  efficiency  and  effectiveness  of  investing  in 
agriculture into account, which is influenced by the governance of this sector. In view of 
the considerable decline of donor funding for agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa, it would 
also be useful to identify the reasons for this decline.  
 
References 
African  Union,  2003.  Declaration  on  Agriculture  and  Food  Security  in  Africa. 
Assembly/AU/Decl.7  (II).  http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/Documents/Decisions/hog/12HoGAssembly2003.pdf 
Bates,  R.H,  1981.  Markets  and  States  in  Tropical  Africa  –  The  Political  Basis  of 
Agricultural Policies. University of California Press. Berkeley etc. 
Binswanger, H., Deininger, K. 1997. Explaining Agricultural and Agrarian Policies in 
Developing Countries, in: Journal of Economic Literature, 35, 1958-2005. 
Chen, S. and M. Ravaillon. 2004. “How have the World’s Poorest Fared since the Early 
1980s? in World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 19 (1): 141-169. 
De Gorter, H. and J. Swinnen. 2002. Political Economy of Agricultural Policy. Chapter 
36 in Handbook of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 2, Part 2, Elsevier, pp. 1893-
1943. 
DeJanvry,  A.  1981.  The  Agrarian  Question  and  Reformism  in  Latin  America.  Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
Diamond, L.  2003.  “Advancing Democratic Governance:  A Global Perspective on the 
Status of Democracy and Directions for International Assistance,” working draft, 
Stanford University, Hoover Institution.  
Ellis, F. 2005. Small Farms, Livelihood Diversification, and Rural-Urban Transitions: 
Strategic  Issues  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa.  In:  IFPRI  (International  Food  Policy 
Research Institute), 2005. The future of small farms: Proceedings of a research 
workshop, Wye, UK, June 26-29, 2005. Washington, DC, pp. 135-149. 
Fan,  S.,  Rao.  N.,    2003.  Public  Spending  in  Developing  Countries  –  Trends, 
Determination  and  Impact.  Environment  and  Production  Technology  Division.   10 
Discussion Paper No. 99. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
Washington, DC. 
Hazell, P. and X. Diao (2005): The Role of Agriculture and Small Farms in Economic 
Development. In: IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute), 2005. The 
future of small farms: Proceedings of a research workshop, Wye, UK, June 26-29, 
2005. Washington, DC, pp. 135-149. 
Hazell, P., and A. Roell. 1983. Rural Growth Linkages: Household Expenditure Patterns 
in  Malaysia  and  Nigeria.  Research  Report  No.  41,  International  Food  Policy 
Research Institute, Washington, D.C. 
Hicks, A., Misra, J., 1993. Two Perspectives on the Welfare State: Political Resources 
and the Growth of Welfare in Affluent Capitalist Democracies, 1960-1982, in: 
American Journal of Sociology, 99 (3), 668-710. 
Keefer,P.  and  S.Khemani.  2003.    “Democracy,  Public  Expenditures,  and  the  Poor.”  
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3164,  World Bank:  Washington, 
DC.   
Krueger, A., Schiff, M., Valdez A., 1991. (Eds.): The Political Economy of Agricultural 
Pricing Policy. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
Lipton, M. 2005. “The Family Farm in a Globalizing World.” 2020 Discussion Paper. 
International Food Policy Research Institute. IFPRI, Washington, DC. 
Lopez, R. 2005. Why Governments Should Stop Non-Social Subsidies: Measuring Their 
Consequences for Rural Latin America, World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper No. 3609  
Mellor, J. (1976): “The New Economics of Growth.” Cornell Press, Ithcaca, NY. 
Rosegrant, M.W., Cline, S. A., Li, W., Sulser, T.B., Valmonte-Santos, R. 2005. Looking 
Ahead - Long-Term Prospects for Africa’s Agricultural Development and Food 
Security. 2020 Discussion Paper 41, International Food Policy Research Institute 
(IFPRI), Washington, DC. 
Sen,  A.,  1981.  Poverty  and  Famines.  An  Essay  on  Entitlement  and  Deprivation. 
Clarendon Press,  Oxford.   11 
Swinnen, J.F.M, A. Banerjee, Gorter, H. de,  2001. Economic Development, Institutional 
change, and the Political Economy of Agricultural Protection:  An Econometric 
Study of Belgium since the 19
th Century,” Agricultural Economics, 26, 25-43.  
   12 
Table 1: Countries Included in the Analysis 
Country  Share of 
Agriculture 
(Percent) in 2002 
Average Polity Index 
1980 – 2002  
(Range - 10 to + 10) 
Botswana        .041  8.0 
BurkinaFaso  .074  -5.3 
Cameroon        .018  - 6.0 
Coted'Ivoire  .015  n.a. 
Ethiopia  .105  - 3.1 
Ghana       .020  - 2.2 
Kenya       .036  - 4.7 
Malawi  .055  - 2.9 
Mali        .138  - 0.3 
Nigeria  .028  - 1.9 
Togo  .019  - 4.6 
Uganda       .022  - 3.2 
Zambia  .055  - 2.7 
Zimbabwe  .005  - 3.3 
Sources: IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook (2003), Polity IV Dataset   13 
 
Table 2: Description of variables 
Variable name  Description  Data Source 
Variable to be explained 
Agshare  Share  of  agriculture  in  total 
government spending * 
Calculated from various issues of the 
IMF’s Government Finance Statistics 
Indicators of instrumental political resources 
Rural_pop  Rural population as percentage of 
total population  
World development Indicators  2005 
Ethnic_frac  Ethnic fractionalization index   Robert Bates 
Ag_Export  Measures the value of agriculture 
and food exports as a percentage 
of  total  merchandise  exports,  if 
the  share  food  or  agricultural 
exports  is  the  largest  among  all 
merchandise exports. Comprises: 
•  Indicator variable for 
whether the share food or 
agricultural exports is the 
largest 
•  The value of these exports as 
percentage of total 
merchandise exports*. 
Calculated  using  several  variables 
from  African  Development 
Indicators 
Indicators of infrastructural political resources 
Polity  A  measure of democratic status: 
takes  values  -10  to  +10 
depending  on  a  variety  on 
institutional  features  ranging 
from constraints on the executive 
to the openness of elections. 
POLITY IV dataset 
Reg_Time  Measures  how  long  the  country 
has been democratic or autocratic 
respectively  
Database of Political Institutions 
ODA  Net ODA from all donors*  African Development Indicators 
GDP_cap  GDP  per  capita*  (in  current 
LCU) 
World development Indicators  2005 
TotRevNoGrant  Total  government  revenues 
excluding all grants* 




Dummy  variable  to  indicate 
decade  of  1980s  and  1990s 
respectively 
Dummies 
Lag_drought  Indicator  for  drought  in  the 
previous year 
African Development Indicators 
* All in current Local Currency Units (LCU)   14 
Table 3: Determinants of Spending on Agriculture (Pooled sample of democracies 
and non-democracies) 
    Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Indicators of instrumental political resources 
Rural_pop  0.003  0.001  0.001 
  (4.04)**  (2.87)**  (3.94)** 
Ethnic_frac  -0.146     
Ag_Export  -0.001  -0.000   
  (2.63)*  (0.09)   
Indicators of infra-structural political resources 
Polity  -0.002  0.001  0.001 
  (1.70)  (1.81)  (2.42)* 
Reg_Time  -0.001  0.000  0.001 
  (1.63)  (0.78)  (3.35)** 
ODA  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (1.46)  (1.20)  (3.03)** 
GDP_cap  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (2.60)*  (3.18)**  (3.42)** 
TotRevNoGrant  0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (2.11)*  (0.92)  (2.06)* 
Other factors 
DUM_80  0.028  0.053  0.048 
  (3.13)**  (5.58)**  (6.76)** 
DUM_90  0.000  0.012  0.012 
  (.)  (1.69)  (1.96) 
Lag_Drought  0.009  0.005  0.005 
  (0.81)  (0.58)  (0.88) 
Constant  -0.054  -0.051  -0.030 
  (0.91)  (1.85)  (1.93) 
Observations  73  150  269 
R-squared  0.59  0.49  0.41 
Variable to be explained: Agshare 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses       
* Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%         15 
Table 4: Determinants of Spending on Agriculture, Sample of democracies and non-
democracies 
            Agshare:Democracies  
       
Agshare: Non-Democracies 
Instrumental political resources 
Rural_pop  0.003  -0.000 
  (4.77)**  (0.20) 
Ag_Export  -0.000  0.001 
  (2.02)*  (2.19)* 
Instrumental political resources 
Polity  -0.003  -0.003 
  (1.45)  (1.35) 
Reg_Time  -0.000  0.000 
  (0.01)  (0.32) 
ODA  0.000  -0.000 
  (1.33)  (0.57) 
GDP_cap  -0.000  0.000 
  (4.25)**  (1.12) 
TotRevNoGrant  0.000  -0.000 
  (1.75)  (1.80) 
Other factors 
DUM_80  0.036  0.046 
  (2.87)**  (1.71) 
DUM_90  0.009  -0.000 
  (0.90)  (0.02) 
Lag_Drought  0.009  0.006 
  (1.00)  (0.39) 
Constant  -0.149  0.053 
  (4.14)**  (0.74) 
Observations  103  47 
R-squared  0.64  0.48 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses     
* Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%     
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Figure  1:  Development  of  Government  Expenditure  and  ODA  Grants  for 














































































































Govt. Exp ODA Grants
 
Sources: OECD Creditor Reporting Systems, IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbooks  
Figure 2: Development of Government Expenditure and ODA Grants for Education 















































































































Govt. Exp ODA Grants
 
Sources: OECD Creditor Reporting Systems, IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbooks 
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Figure 3: Development of Government Expenditure and ODA Grants for Health in 
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Sources: OECD Creditor Reporting Systems, IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbooks 
 
 
 